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Allocating Resources within a Big City
School District: New York City after
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York
In 2003 the New York State Court of Appeals ruled in Campaign
for Fiscal Equity v. New York that New York State was not
meeting its constitutional obligation to provide a “sound basic
education” in New York City schools (see Duncombe,
Lukemeyer, and Yinger, CPR Policy Brief No. 28/2004, for a
summary of the case). In November 2004, a court-appointed
panel of special masters reported that the additional operating
cost was approximately $5.6 billion per year (Feerick, Milonas,
and Thompson 2004).
The total amount of new funding required for New York City
public schools has been the focus of extraordinary study and
debate. But relatively little attention has focused on how these
additional resources will be distributed across schools within
New York City. The CFE decision requires New York State to
provide adequate educational funding to New York City, but it
does not specify that individual schools within the district receive
adequate funding. Thus, even if New York City receives
adequate funding at the district level, it is possible that adequate
resources will still not reach those schools serving students with
the greatest needs, especially if future spending follows historical
spending patterns. In small school districts with only a handful of
schools, disparities across schools are of little consequence, but
they can be enormously important in a large district such as New
York City, which serves more than 1,000,000 students in over
1,300 schools.
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In this brief we take a closer look at the mechanisms used to
distribute resources across schools. This brief summarizes and
builds upon the authors’ ongoing work with Leanna Stiefel and
Amy Ellen Schwartz investigating the intradistrict distribution of
resources within large school districts. We first present what we
know about the current distribution of educational resources
within New York City and other large city districts. Then we
discuss current efforts to promote greater equity in the
distribution of resources and improve student performance. We
conclude with lessons and policy implications for New York
State as it implements the CFE decision in New York City. These
findings also apply to other large districts in the state, such as
Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Albany.
Our focus in this brief is on vertical equity—ensuring that
schools serving students with different levels of needs receive
appropriately different levels of resources—rather than adequacy.
But the two concepts are closely related. If we ensure that
students with a variety of needs have ample resources to achieve
agreed upon educational goals, we will achieve both school-level
adequacy and vertical equity.

Previous Research and Litigation
The growing focus on schools as the locus of accountability,
combined with better data availability, has led to increased
attention to the level and distribution of resources at the school
level. A small amount of research on this topic dates back to the
1970s and 1980s (Summers and Wolfe 1976; Ginsburg,
Moskowitz, and Rosenthal 1981). Most of the available evidence,
however, has accumulated since the mid-1990s.
Most school finance litigation, such as the CFE case, has focused
on state formulas to distribute resources across school districts,
but a large urban school district can itself be the target of
litigation over the distribution of funding across individual
schools within the district. The Los Angeles Unified School

2

Ross Rubenstein and Lawrence Miller
District faced such a lawsuit, Rodriguez v. LAUSD (1992), in
which plaintiffs argued that schools in poorer Los Angeles
neighborhoods had less experienced and less educated teachers—
and therefore lower funding—than schools in wealthier
neighborhoods. The district entered into a consent decree in 1992
that required greater equalization across schools. Some evidence
suggests that the case has resulted in greater funding equity
across schools, though not greater equalization of teacher
experience (Sugarman 2002).
Disparities Uncovered

In a comprehensive overview of research on school-level
resource distribution, Stiefel and colleagues (2004) identify
almost 20 studies dating back over 25 years examining the
school-level distribution of various resources, including dollars,
teacher-pupil ratios, and teacher characteristics. A number of
studies (for example, Summers and Wolfe 1976; Rubenstein
1998; Iatarola and Stiefel 2003) examine resource allocations
across schools within a single large school district, while others
(such as Clark 1998; Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Berne 1998)
examine the distribution within (but not across) several large
districts. Still others (such as Betts, Rueben, and Danenberg
2000; Burke 1999; Hertert 1996) use school-level data to
compare resources across schools in different districts.
Across-District Studies Mask Across-School Disparities

The studies looking across districts find that district-level
averages typically understate the level of disparities that exists
across schools within the districts.
• For example, Hertert (1996) compares per pupil expenditures
in California across districts, across schools (ignoring districts),
and across schools within districts, and finds that differences
between schools in different districts are substantially greater
than average spending differences between districts.
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• Owens and Maiden (1999) examine the distribution of
instructional expenditures across districts and schools in Florida
and find substantially larger disparities between schools than
between districts. They also find that, at the school level, the
higher the percentage of African American students and students
eligible for subsidized or free lunches, the lower the level of
instructional expenditures.
Sometimes higher concentrations of students with special needs,
such as low-income students, are associated with higher levels of
per pupil spending.
• For example, Schwartz (1999) uses data on over 3,000 schools
in Ohio for the 1995-1996 school year and finds that, controlling
for district fixed effects, higher student poverty is associated with
higher spending, with an even stronger relationship when the
sample is limited to the state’s largest urban districts.
• In their review of the research on intradistrict resource
allocation, Stiefel and colleagues (2004) find a significant
positive relationship in 5 of 11 school-level studies examining the
relationship between spending and poverty, with significant
negative relationships in only 2 studies. However, these findings
come with the caveat that expenditure data alone may mask a
tradeoff between quality and quantity of resources.
Teacher Quantity-Quality Tradeoff in High-Poverty Schools

The growing availability of school-level personnel data has made
it easier for researchers to analyze the number and type of staff
employed across schools, to determine whether a quantity-quality
tradeoff takes place. A common finding in research examining
the distribution of teachers is that high-poverty schools often
have more teachers relative to pupils, but that these teachers are
generally more inexperienced and educated and, thus, lower paid.
• As early as the 1970s, Summers and Wolfe (1976) found
significantly lower education levels and teacher exam scores in

4

Ross Rubenstein and Lawrence Miller
schools with higher poverty and higher proportions of black
students in Philadelphia.
• Several years later, Ginsburg and colleagues (1981) examined
the distribution of teacher inputs (professionals and
paraprofessionals per 1,000 pupils, teacher education, experience,
and salary) in relation to special needs students (minority, lowincome, low test scores) for New York State schools for 19761977. They found more professionals and paraprofessionals per
student in high-poverty and high-minority schools, but the
teachers in these schools tended to have less experience and
lower salaries.
• Stiefel and colleagues (1998) provide an overview of
intradistrict resource allocation research in Chicago, New York
City, Rochester, and Fort Worth and report low variations in base
funding across schools in each city, but also find lower teacher
salaries in high-poverty schools, sometimes offset by more staff
relative to pupils in those schools.
• Similarly, Rubenstein (1998) examines the distribution of
budget dollars per pupil across Chicago schools, separated by
funding source (General Fund, Special Education, Desegregation,
state Chapter 1) and school level (elementary vs. high schools).
He finds that both high- and low-poverty elementary and high
schools receive similar General Fund positions per pupil, but that
average teacher salaries are significantly lower in higher poverty
schools, leading to lower General Fund dollar allocations in the
higher poverty schools (particularly elementary schools).
• Betts and colleagues (2000) compare California schools in
1997-1998 and find relatively little variation in average class
sizes across schools but large differences in teacher qualifications
as measured by experience, education, and credentialing. They
also find relatively large variations in the number of advanced
placement (AP) courses offered and in the percentage of courses
that satisfy public university entrance requirements.
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• Ingersoll (2002) uses the three Schools and Staffing Survey
(SASS) datasets to compare school characteristics and teacher
qualifications and finds that teachers in high-poverty, highminority schools tend to have lower qualifications and are far
more likely to be assigned to teach classes that they have not
majored in.
• Roza and Hill (2004) examine within-district differences in
dollars spent per school for Baltimore City, Baltimore County,
Cincinnati, and Seattle and report that teachers in low-poverty
schools and those in high-performing schools tend to have higher
average salaries than do teachers in high-poverty and lowperforming schools. They also find that schools with the most
applicants for teacher positions have the highest paid teachers,
because they have the most choices and therefore hire more
experienced and educated teachers. They argue that the allocation
of Title I resources to hire teachers compounds the inequity
because schools with lower-paid teachers subsidize schools with
higher-paid teachers.
Financial Reporting Masks Variations across Schools

The ways in which data are reported, such as reporting only a
fraction of district expenditures at the school level, and using
average costs can often mask real resource variations across
schools.
• Roza and colleagues (2005) report that in Denver only 45
percent of the district’s operating budget is reported in individual
school budgets while the rest is reported at the district level.
Approximately one-quarter of these centrally-reported district
expenditures, though, represent shared resources used to provide
services across multiple schools (for example, bilingual education
services). When the researchers allocated these shared resources
to individual schools, the services accounted for an additional
$1,000 in spending per pupil, on average. Their findings suggest
that transparency may play a direct role in improving equity
between schools, as the more transparent school budgets were
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distributed more equitably than the much more opaque centrallyreported budgets.
• In addition, the common practice of reporting average rather
than actual teacher salaries by school can hide substantial
resource differences. Roza and Hill (2004) report that if all
schools received funding for only an average teacher salary for
each teacher position, schools above and below the salary
average would lose or gain 4 to 6 percent of their budgets, with
gains of over a half million dollars and losses close to $1 million
for schools at the extremes.
Studies of New York City

As the largest district in the nation, and one in which detailed
schools site resource data has been collected, New York City has
increasingly become a focus of research on school-level
resources.
• Iatarola and Stiefel (2003) explore the intradistrict equity of
inputs and outputs, including expenditures, teacher resources, and
performance across 840 elementary and middle schools in New
York City in 1997-1998. They find that disparities in resources at
the school level are generally greater than those reported for
interdistrict studies (particularly in middle schools). Similar to
results in other cities, the authors also find that elementary
schools with higher proportions of students with special needs
(with the exception of immigrant status) tend to have more
teachers per student, but with lower salaries. They find similar
results for schools with higher proportions of non-white students
in both elementary and middle schools.
• Stiefel and colleagues (2004) estimate de facto spending
models to assess the factors that appear to drive resource
allocations across New York City elementary and middle
schools. Consistent with previous studies, they find significantly
higher teacher-pupil ratios in high-poverty schools, but
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significantly lower salaries, less teacher experience, and lower
percentages of teachers with master’s degrees and full licenses.
• Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002) use data for all of New
York State to explore teacher sorting and report that urban areas
generally have less qualified teachers than non-urban areas and
that, within large urban districts, low-performing, poor, and nonwhite children are more likely to have teachers who are not
certified and who have failed certification exams. They conclude
that teacher transfers and quits may exacerbate these differences
as teachers, particularly those with the most skills, are more
likely to leave urban schools with many poor students.
Much categorical funding, such as federal Title I funding, is
intended to provide supplemental resources in high-poverty
schools, but allocation methods at the district level often limit
these effects.
• Brown (2005) examines Title I allocations in the three largest
U.S. school districts and finds that New York City was the only
district of the three being compared (LAUSD and Chicago were
the other two) in which Title I funds appear to supplement state
and local funds. In addition, though, Brown finds that New York
City fails to meet the vertical equity intent of Title I funding as
schools with higher concentrations of poor pupils did not receive
higher Title I funding per pupil. Moreover, there were wide
ranging anomalies in the allocation of Title I including one
school that received $4,864 per pupil, or nearly seven times the
average per pupil allocation.
Summary of Research Findings

In sum, the existing studies on school-level resource disparities in
New York City and elsewhere have often reached remarkably
similar conclusions.
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1. Resource disparities found across schools may be as large
as or larger than the more widely recognized disparities
across districts.
2. These disparities are generally not explained by
differences in school and student characteristics. On the
contrary, schools with greater student needs often find
themselves disadvantaged relative to other schools in the
same district, particularly in terms of the quality of
teacher resources.
3. These patterns are not caused by the intentional targeting
of resources to lower-need schools, but are frequently the
result of position-based funding formulas, average cost
budgeting practices, and teacher sorting patterns that
allow higher paid teachers to systematically opt into
lower-need schools without financial ramifications for the
schools they transfer from or to.
The next section addresses efforts and proposals to address these
school-level disparities.

Alternative School-Based Funding Systems
Current Allocation Methods in New York City

Resources are allocated to schools in New York City through a
series of formulas based largely on each school’s student register
and number of students with special needs.
Base Instructional Allocation

Most funding (82 percent of school-level allocations in FY 2005)
is allocated through the Base Instructional Allocation (see NYC
Department of Education 2004 for details). The Base
Instructional Allocation consists of three components:
1.

a school overhead allocation to fund a principal and
selected other administrative personnel;
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2.

a base teacher allocation, which divides each school’s
general and special education register by maximum class
sizes for each grade and program to calculate the number
of teachers required (as well as adjustments for such
factors as teacher prep and lunch periods, frequency of
course offerings, and “breakage,” that is, additional
teachers needed when the student register does not divide
evenly by the maximum class size); and

3.

a per capita allocation to fund other basic needs such as
assistant principals, paraprofessionals, aides, and
instructional supplies.

The remainder of each school’s allocation is provided through a
series of specialized formulas targeting students with special
needs (such as students with limited English proficiency and
those eligible for free lunch), specific types of schools (for
example, new schools, schools under registration review), certain
grades (for example, early grades class size reduction) and
specific types of expenditures (such as school-based support
teams).
An important aspect of the base teacher allocation is that each
school budgets for average, not actual, teacher salaries.
Therefore, all things being equal, schools with higher paid
teachers do not face a tighter budget constraint than those with
lower paid teachers, and schools with lower paid teachers do not
have additional resources for other purposes.
Proposed or Implemented Allocation Options

The review below discusses several options that have been
proposed or implemented to address potential inequities that may
arise from such a position-based funding system.
Weighted Student Funding

In recent years, several large districts around the country have
taken steps to reduce their reliance on traditional position-based
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allocation formulas by introducing weighted student budgeting
(Miles and Roza 2005). Drawing on experience in Edmonton,
Alberta, districts in Seattle, Houston, Cincinnati, and San
Francisco have begun implementing weighted student allocation
formulas in recent years (Archer 2004).
Weighted student funding formulas hold considerable promise
for reducing intradistrict resource disparities. Miles and Roza
(2005) examine school-level equity before and after the
implementation of these funding systems in Cincinnati and
Houston and find that funding disparities unrelated to student
characteristics were virtually eliminated in Cincinnati and
decreased slightly in Houston. They conclude that details matter;
the choice of student weights and the share of district resources
allocated through the formula will affect the degree to which
equity goals are achieved. The use of district average teacher
salaries (average costs) instead of actual school site teacher
salaries (real costs) continues to hinder intradistrict equity gains
in the districts that have implemented weighted student funding,
however. Oakland, California, which has begun the process of
charging schools actual rather than district average teacher
salaries in conjunction with the use of the system, is a notable
exception (Archer 2004).
Intradistrict allocation formulas based on teacher positions, such
as those currently in place in New York City, complicate efforts
to enhance school-level resource equity, as schools may compete
for the most educated and experienced (i.e, highest paid) teachers
with no financial penalty. Odden and Busch (1998) recommend
that schools be charged actual teacher salaries, but with a sevenyear phase-in period. Similarly, Roza and Hill (2004) recommend
that states fund children, rather than districts or schools, with
funding following children to their schools. Such a student-based
approach also has implications for systems employing enhanced
public or private school choice (Rubenstein and Picus 2003).
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Weighted student funding is often implemented along with more
general decentralization efforts designed to provide enhanced
management and resource allocation discretion to school
personnel. Ouchi (2004) reports that in three large districts using
traditional budgeting systems, the percentage of the school’s
budget under the discretion of the principal ranged from 19.1
percent in Chicago to 6.1 percent in New York City. Conversely,
in three districts using a weighted student funding system, the
proportion of the budget controlled by the school’s principal
ranged between 59 and 92 percent. While a weighted student
formula could, in theory, be implemented without decentralizing
budgetary control, the system provides important new
opportunities for school personnel to control the use of resources
and, in particular, the mix of staff, at the school site.
School-Based Funding

While weighted student formulas typically focus on the methods
that districts use to allocate resources across schools, a number of
researchers have advocated changing state funding formulas by
moving the basic unit of support from the district to the school.
Such a “school-based funding” system would largely remove the
discretion of school districts to re-allocate funds across schools.
For example, Guthrie (1997) has proposed a school-based
financing system, with 90 percent pass-through of funds to the
school site, including capital outlays. He also recommends that
schools be given discretion for purchasing and other resource
allocation decisions. Similarly, Hess (1995) discusses problems
with examining equity from only a district-level perspective and
proposes a school-based funding system in which 85 percent of
district funds are allocated to the school site. Hess simulates the
funding under such a system, which would result in a range of
expenditure levels of no more than 1.45:1 across all schools.
Allan Odden has written most extensively and in the greatest
detail about the structure of a school-based funding system. For
example, in Odden (2001) he argues that states in the U.S. should
follow England’s lead in creating need-based school (rather than
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district) funding formulas. The formulas can include a base
amount per pupil, with adjustments for student needs, grade level
differences, and particular school needs.
Odden and Busch (1998) review three existing examples of
school-based financing: charter schools, the Australian model,
and the British model (for other useful overviews of the
Australian and British systems see Hill 1997; Caldwell 1997).
Victoria, Australia, began school-based financing in 1993, with
approximately 87 percent of funding budgeted at the school site.
Schools have the ability to determine their own staffing mix (i.e.,
regular teachers, specialists, support staff) or convert a teacher
position to a cash allotment to be used for other purposes. In
England, school-based funding has been in place since the late
1980s, though funds flow through Local Education Agencies
(LEAs). Approximately 85 percent of the budget is allocated
directly from the central government to schools as a lump sum.
LEAs are required to determine funding formulas, with at least
80 percent based on “age weighted pupil units,” though LEAs
can develop their own formulas for calculating these pupil units
and schools are charged for actual teacher salaries.
Based on experience in these districts, Odden and Busch (1998)
develop proposals for a school-based funding system in the
United States. They suggest that districts would be required to
identify functions to be devolved to schools and those retained by
the district, determine the portion of resources to go with these
devolved functions, and develop formulas to allocate the
resources to schools. The state would retain authority to structure
the ways in which districts can develop these school funding
formulas.

Improving School-Level Resource Reports
One of the biggest challenges that researchers continue to face
when examining intradistrict resource allocation patterns is the
availability of school-level data. According to a recent survey by
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Education Week, 23 states collect school-level financial
information, suggesting at least moderate demand for such
information. A generally accepted method of accounting for
school-level resources does not exist, though, and this ambiguity
fuels mounting concerns about how to report costs among our
nation’s schools (Archer 2004, Educational Testing Service
2004).
Efforts to address weaknesses in school-level data have resulted
in several proposals aimed at improving the transparency and
usability of school-level resources (see Chambers 1999; Odden et
al. 2003); however, school budgets do not include many centrally
reported resources that appear instead in consolidated central
department budgets, making it difficult to determine which
schools ultimately benefit from them.
One model, developed by Coopers & Lybrand and implemented
in New York City in 1994, accounts for a greater share of district
resources at the school level by allocating costs based on the
face-to-face principle. With this model, only the cost of personnel
that physically work within schools is reported at the school
level, while administration and operations costs associated with
central services remain centrally reported (Coopers & Lybrand
1994). While this strategy facilitates reporting a greater portion of
shared resources at the school level than is typically reported,
some within-district variation is lost and analysis of effective
resource use becomes more difficult (Miller, Roza, and Swartz
2005). For reporting purposes it may be most useful to show
school site spending both with and without these indirect cost
allocations.
A recent National Center for Education Statistics publication
calls for districts to allocate all spending to schools, including
district administrative and school board costs. The rationale states
that “the provision of educational services through operation of
schools is the only product of a school district [and] the
allocation of these costs is necessary to full costing of the schools
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and their programs” (National Forum on Education Statistics
2003). No cost allocation model has yet been developed to
execute the recommendation; however, a recent paper by Miller,
Roza, and Swartz (2005) proposes a model by which typical
school budget data are supplemented with spending data on
centrally reported resources, both of which are then classified by
student type, to enable comparisons of spending differences
between schools.

New York City after Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New
York
The remainder of this brief discusses policy alternatives for New
York City as it works toward achieving adequacy and equity for
all of its students.
Researchers have consistently found staff-based allocation
systems used to allocate resources from the central office to the
schools to be highly inequitable. These findings have led to a
search for alternative mechanisms, and no other alternative has
garnered more interest than weighted student funding.
Weighted Student Funding

New York City could follow the lead of districts such as
Edmonton, Cincinnati, Seattle, Oakland, San Francisco, and
Houston in implementing a weighted student funding formula.
Weighted student funding systems shift the focus from the
resource being allocated, teachers for example, to the recipient of
the resources, the student. All students start with an equal amount
of base level funding; students with special needs (e.g., English
language learners, students with learning or physical disabilities)
receive higher funding to equate the cost of their education with
the amount of resources the school actually receives.
The potential benefits of this system include a high level of
vertical equity and greater transparency. The success of a
weighted student funding system ultimately hinges on a number
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of important details that the district would need to consider,
including teacher distribution, calculation of appropriate weights,
and accounting for economies and diseconomies of scale
(discussed below).
Teacher Distribution

Ensuring an equitable distribution of teachers while still
protecting teachers’ workplace rights presents one of the most
vexing challenges for school-based funding systems. As
described earlier, much of the disparity in resources across
schools may be attributable to the sorting of teachers and the
resulting strong correlations between teacher characteristics and
student characteristics. Teacher preferences, in particular, may
often work against recruitment efforts in urban districts, and
against schools within districts serving students who may be
perceived as being more “difficult” (Lankford, Wyckoff, and
Loeb 2002).
Moving from position-based to dollar-based funding on its own
might not be sufficient to affect the distribution of teachers
significantly unless districts choose to eliminate average cost
budgeting practices as well. If schools work with budgets in
dollars rather than positions, they would be forced to make
tradeoffs between the quantity and the “quality” of teachers in the
school (to the extent that quality is associated with observable
characteristics such as experience and education that are
rewarded in teacher salary schedules). With existing teacher
salary schedules, this would not, however, change existing
teacher incentives to choose schools they perceive as having the
most desirable work environment. Therefore, it is quite possible
that schools serving fewer students with special needs would
continue to hire fewer higher-paid teachers while schools with
more special needs students could hire additional teachers, but
would largely be left with newer and less-educated teachers.
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Two potential elements of a student-based formula could affect
teacher assignments, though. First, student weighting would
provide relatively more funding to schools serving more students
with special needs and relatively less funding to other schools.
Therefore, under a weighted student formula schools with fewer
“high-weight” students would lack the resources to hire large
numbers of the highest paid teachers, potentially increasing the
supply of such teachers for high-need schools. Second, a
weighted student formula could be implemented along with a
system of differential pay for teachers working in the hardest-tostaff schools and grades. Differential teacher pay would be,
perhaps, the most controversial proposal described here, and
would be quite difficult to implement under existing collective
bargaining agreements (unions in some urban districts, though,
such as Denver, have approved differential pay for hard-to-staff
schools). One possibility for implementing such a proposal
within current arrangements is for the state, rather than New
York City, to set aside a portion of any funding increase to
support bonuses for teachers agreeing to work in schools with the
greatest needs (Ballou 2004). It is unclear, though, how large
these bonuses would need to be; the limited evidence on wage
differentials suggests they could be quite large (Odden and Kelly
2000; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2004).
The ability to identify high performing teachers is critical to
accurately evaluate current teacher distribution patterns and
policies, such as wage differentials, aimed at improving the
equity of teacher distribution. Recent research on nationally
certified teachers finds that teachers who earn national
certification are at least marginally more effective than both
average teachers and teachers who sought, but failed to earn, this
certification. Furthermore, applicants who earn certification
appear more effective at raising student achievement and have a
greater impact on low-income students (Goldhaber and Anthony
2004). Unfortunately, only 12 percent of nationally certified
teachers teach in high-poverty schools (greater than 75 percent
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free or reduced priced lunch) (Humphrey, Koppich, and Hough
2005).
Determining Appropriate Student Weights

A growing literature has examined the cost of providing an
adequate education for students, with much of the work focusing
on New York and other states embroiled in adequacy litigation
(see, for example, Duncombe and Yinger 1997; Duncombe,
Lukemeyer, and Yinger 2004; Chambers et al. 2004). While
detailed discussion of the methods used to estimate adequate
funding levels is outside the scope of this brief (see Duncombe,
Lukemeyer, and Yinger 2004 for an excellent overview and
critique of methods used to estimate adequate funding), selection
of appropriate funding weights is crucial if adequate resources
are to reach students. While the majority of adequacy studies
have focused on school districts rather than schools within
districts, the weights derived from these studies may be
appropriate starting points for developing funding formulas.
Unlike the ad hoc weights often found in state and district-level
formulas, the student weights derived from these adequacy
studies are empirically linked to student performance levels. The
weights found in many funding formulas often represent political
compromises rather than empirically derived decisions regarding
the appropriate level of funding for different types of students.
Thus, to the extent that shifting to a new weighting system
produces winners and losers, it is likely to be politically
controversial.
Estimating appropriate weights is also complicated by issues of
marginal and average costs, particularly at different enrollment
levels. For example, the marginal cost for serving the first student
with limited English proficiency can be expected to be
considerably higher than the cost for serving the tenth such
student. Conversely, high concentrations of students with special
needs (for example, students from low-income families) could
result in higher marginal costs per student. Using weights based
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only on average costs may result in under-funding or overfunding certain schools. Several alternatives are possible to
address this issue. One possibility is to include higher funding
weights for schools with low incidence of certain student needs,
or to fund those schools on a cost reimbursement basis, as is
often done with low-incidence special education services.
Another option is to start with a base funding amount for the
fixed costs associated with running a special program, and then to
allocate weighted per pupil funding in addition to the base. To
address higher costs from higher concentrations of students with
special needs, the formula could include higher per pupil weights
for schools over a certain threshold, for example schools in which
more than 60 percent of the students are from low-income
families. Since low-performing students in New York tend to be
heavily concentrated in a small number of schools (Boyd,
Lankford, and Loeb 2004), it may be particularly important to
focus additional resources on these schools.
A related issue is how districts identify student needs for the
purposes of funding. New York City collects quite detailed data
on student characteristics, including unique data such as the
percentage of recent immigrants and their home countries. These
data provide an opportunity for the district to effectively target
subpopulations of students. Again, though, the effectiveness of
such targeting is dependent on how the district chooses to define
student needs (for example, federal Title I funding in New York
City is currently distributed based on proportions of students
eligible for free but not reduced price lunches, thereby targeting
schools serving only the poorest children [Brown 2005]), and the
appropriateness of funding weights assigned to these children.
Small Schools

Unless it accounts for potentially higher costs associated with
small size, a weighted student funding formula could
disadvantage small schools, many of which have opened over the
past several years and are currently being developed in New York
City. New York City is not alone in turning to small schools as a
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reform strategy; Los Angeles and Chicago, the second and third
largest districts in the country, have recently announced small
school strategies as well. The LAUSD, in fact, has announced
that all secondary schools will transform into small schools
within three years.
Small schools are related to the discussion of adequacy and
equity because opponents of the reform strategy often allege that
small schools cost more than larger schools due, in part, to scale
advantages. Proponents counter that input costs are arbitrary and
that on a cost per graduate basis, small schools may actually cost
less (Stiefel et al. 2000). In other work examining economies of
scale using production functions, Andrews, Duncombe, and
Yinger (2000) find that high schools serving 600-900 pupils may
best balance scale advantages with the potential negative effects
of larger schools. Research on the cost of small high schools in
Seattle and Denver (Roza, Swartz, and Miller 2005) finds that
small schools appear more expensive when school budgets are
considered in isolation. However, when full costs, which include
school budgets, real salaries, central budgets for educational
services, and the cost of non-educational services (e.g., food
service and transportation), are analyzed then the costs of small
schools may not be uniformly higher. In developing a funding
formula for New York City, care must be taken that the formulas
do not impose undue financial burdens on small high schools.
Decentralization of Resource Allocation Decisions

The NYC public schools have a long history of decentralization
followed by consolidation dating back to the 1960s (Ravitch
1974). In 1997, the district began an experiment in school-based
budgeting termed the Performance-Driven Budget (PDB)
initiative (Siegel and Fruchter 2002). Under the plan, schools
established School Leadership Teams with discretion “to
combine multiple funding sources to split-fund staff; hire people
full-time, part-time or on a per-session or per diem basis; and
move money between and among personnel and non-personnel
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categories, activities and programs” (Siegel and Fruchter 2002,
iv). Though evidence on the effectiveness of school-based
management and budgeting in improving student performance is
scarce, an evaluation of the PDB initiative found evidence of
significant performance gains in PDB pilot schools (Stiefel et al.
2003). Though PDB is no longer in place in New York City, the
district began a new school-based budgeting initiative in the
2003-2004 school year that provides principals with the authority
to budget resources within the school, in consultation with a
School Leadership Team. The district’s experience with schoolbased budgeting could provide much-needed capacity for
implementing a decentralized budgeting approach in the future.
While such a system is not mandatory under a weighted student
funding formula, centralized resource allocation may mitigate the
promise of substantial performance and equity gains.
Transparency

If wage differentials are the most controversial recommendation
discussed in this brief, then increased transparency might be
considered the least controversial. The deleterious effect that
budgeting for average teacher salaries has on equity has resulted
in recommendations to end the practice altogether (Moss Adams
2003). With only one district nationally attempting to budget with
actual salaries, strategies to increase demand for such practices
deserve consideration. Legislation has been proposed in
California to enhance transparency by requiring reporting of
actual school site costs and district average costs, including “the
percentage by which the school is above or below the district
wide average” (California Senate Bill 687). The proposal comes
in the wake of a 2005 report by the Education Trust-West finding
substantial spending gaps between high- and low-poverty schools
within many California districts.
New York City may already be ahead of many large school
districts in this area. The Department of Education (formerly
known as the Board of Education) has, for a number of years,
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been releasing School Based Expenditure Reports that report
detailed expenditures by level (central vs. school-based), function
(such as classroom instruction vs. instructional support), and
student program (such as general education vs. full time special
education). These expenditure reports use actual school-level
salaries rather than averages to calculate expenditures.

Conclusions
While most litigation in New York State and elsewhere has
focused on disparities in, and adequacy of, funding across school
districts, it is clear that achieving equitable and adequate funding
across districts is not the end of the story. Unless attention is paid
to the methods used to distribute resources within districts, it is
unlikely that sufficient resources will reach the schools and
students who need them most. On the contrary, if additional
funding is distributed using the methods currently in place in
New York City and in most other large districts, inequities across
schools could actually increase. While this brief has focused on
New York City, it is also quite possible that a statewide remedy
will be implemented that would dramatically increase funding in
the state’s other large districts. While there is little available
evidence regarding intradistrict allocations in the “Big Five”
districts, it is likely that the same patterns are in place, though on
a much smaller scale than in New York.
This brief highlights some of the problems inherent in traditional
school district allocation systems, and describes proposals for
reform. As the discussion points out, attempts to reform
traditional district resource allocation practices face numerous
difficult and potentially controversial issues. Our purpose is not
to advocate for a specific plan, but to describe the importance of
the task and some of the challenges New York City will face in
responding to the CFE decision. To ignore the distribution of
resources across districts risks missing an historic opportunity to
ensure that all students have access to the educational resources
they need.
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